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Abstract 
The paradox of pain refers to the idea that the folk concept of pain is paradoxical, treating 
pains as simultaneously mental states and bodily states (e.g. Hill 2005, 2017; Borg et al. 
2020). By taking a close look at our pain terms, this paper argues that there is no paradox 
of pain. The air of paradox dissolves once we recognise that pain terms are polysemous 
and that there are two separate but related concepts of pain rather than one.  
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1. Introduction 
The term ‘paradox of pain’ refers to the claim that the folk concept of pain is paradoxical, 
treating pains as simultaneously mental and bodily (Hill 2005, 2017; Aydede 2013; Reuter et 
al. 2014; Reuter 2017; Borg et al. 2020). Consider the characterisation of the paradox of pain 
in a recent paper by Borg et al. (2020: 29-30):  
Pain states…seem to be classic Cartesian mental states, possessing the 
characteristic hallmarks of such states: subjectivity, privacy, and incorrigibility. 
Furthermore, philosophers have assumed that this sort of mentalised view 
 
 
captures the ordinary folk notion of pain. … However, a moment’s reflection 
on how people ordinarily think and talk about pain shows that the folk view 
may in fact be somewhat more complex than this model suggests, for folk 
clearly hold that pains, unlike other paradigm mental states like beliefs, have 
(non-brain-based) bodily locations. … Recognition of this fact has led some 
theorists (e.g. Hill 2005) to talk of the ‘paradox of pain’… 
The passage identifies two conceptions of pain. On the one hand, pain seems to be a mental 
state, supported by the claim that pain possesses characteristics that conscious mental states 
are often said to have. These characteristics, as mentioned by Borg et al., are (see also Hill 
2005; Aydede 2013; Reuter et al. 2014; Hardcastle 2015: 531-2; Reuter 2017):  
Privacy: One has privileged access to one’s own pains. 
Subjectivity: If one has pain, then one feels pain.  
Incorrigibility: If one feels pain, then one has pain.  
Subjectivity and incorrigibility jointly entail that there is no appearance-reality distinction 
with respect to pain, i.e. there is no difference between pain and the experience of pain (Kripke 
1980). Indeed, philosophers of mind have traditionally treated pain as an archetypical 
example of phenomenal experience (e.g. Lewis 1980; Tye 2017). Call the conception of pain 
which treats pain as a mental state the ‘mental conception of pain’. 
On the other hand, the folk view of pain also suggests a ‘bodily conception of pain’, 
treating pains as states of the body, located in non-brain-based body parts. As Borg et al. 
note (2020: 30), ‘When someone stubs their toe or cuts their hand the pain is (or at least is 
said to be) in the toe or in the hand’.  
 
 
However, body parts are not the type of entities that can have mental states. In the 
literature, the tension is often put in terms of locations: ‘mental states are not the kind of 
entities that inhabit [non-brain-based] body parts’ (Reuter 2017: 265); they are ‘in the head 
[i.e. brain], if they are anywhere’ (Aydede 2013). If the folk concept of pain treats pain as 
simultaneously a mental state and a bodily state, it would seem that the folk concept is 
paradoxical. 1   
 Theorists have given different responses to the alleged paradox of pain. Hill (2005, 
2017), who coined the term ‘the paradox of pain’, suggests that the folk concept of pain 
should be revised. Hill thinks that we should introduce two separate concepts: ‘peripheral 
pain’, which coheres with the bodily conception, and ‘central state pain’, which coheres 
with the mental conception. Reuter (2017) and his colleagues (2014, 2020) deny the alleged 
paradox. Appealing to empirical data, they argue that the folk only have a bodily 
conception of pain, not a mental conception. Borg et al. (2020) argue that the evidence 
presented by Reuter et al. does not demonstrate that the folk lack a mental conception of 
pain. They think that the ordinary concept of pain is ‘polyeidic’, ‘containing different 
strands or elements’, including both mental and bodily elements, where ‘in different 
 
1 Hill’s (2005, 2017) way of spelling out the paradox of pain is more nuanced. For Hill, the referent 
of our folk concept of pain is tissue damage, but the conceptual role that governs the application 
of our concept of pain suggests pain as perceptual representation (i.e. mental state) rather than 
what is being represented (i.e. tissue damage).  
It is also worth noting that some theorists, instead of speaking of the folk concept of pain as 
paradoxical, take the aforementioned two conceptions of pain to be in tension in the sense that 
they lead to a strange view of pain which treats pains as located in public space, i.e. body parts, 
while being private, subjective and incorrigible (e.g. Hardcastle 2015: 531).  
 
 
contexts different elements of the concept could be activated’ (2020: 30-1). On this view, 
while a clinician might treat pain as a bodily state and a patient might treat pain as a mental 
state, they still ‘share a common concept of pain’ (2020: 45). Proponents of this view take 
the polyeidic nature of the concept of pain to accommodate the intuition that the folk view 
of pain is paradoxical without entailing that it is paradoxical. They claim that while one 
might take pain to be mental in one context and bodily in another, no one would take it to 
be both mental and bodily at the same time (2020: 44).  
All of these proposals agree that there is a single folk concept of pain. The question 
is whether this concept is internally coherent. This paper questions the consensus that there 
is a single concept of pain. It argues that our primary pain terms – ‘pain’, ‘sore’, ‘ache’, and 
‘hurt’ – are polysemous (section 2). This polysemy reflects two concepts of pain, and once 
this is recognised the paradox of pain is resolved (section 3).  The paper concludes with 
wider implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of pain (section 4).  
 
2. Pain Terms and Polysemy  
In English, there are four primary pain terms – ‘pain’, ‘sore’, ‘ache’, and ‘hurt’ – which are 
words specifically dedicated to denoting pain (Fabrega and Tyma 1976; Reznikova et al. 
2012).2 I shall discuss the latter three pain terms first, because they behave in a similar way 
syntactically, and then turn to ‘pain’.  
 
2 Primary pain terms are contrasted with secondary pain terms such as ‘burning’, ‘stinging’, ‘shooting’, 
which are not exclusively tied to pain reports. 
 
 
Consider typical pain reports using the three pain terms – ‘sore’, ‘ache’, and ‘hurt’:  
(1) a. My leg is sore.  
b. My arm is aching.  
c.   My thumb is hurting.  
In (1)-sentences, a body part is described as being in a particular state. On the level of 
surface grammar, pain is treated as a property of a body part, indicated by either an 
adjectival phrase, e.g. ‘sore’ in (1-a), or a verb, e.g. ‘ache’ and ‘hurt’ in their respective 
progressive forms in (1-b) and (1-c). Note that the same predicates also apply to persons:  
(2) a. I am sore.  
b. I am aching.  
c.   I am hurting.  
In (2)-sentences, the surface grammar describes the person or the experiencer, rather than 
the body part, as being in a particular state. I argue that these predicates, which apply to 
both body parts and persons, are polysemous.  
Polysemy is a linguistic phenomenon where a word has multiple related meanings or 
senses. Polysemy is contrasted with homonymy, where a word form has distinct but 
unrelated meanings, e.g. ‘bank’ (financial institution vs. river edge). Instances of polysemy 
and homonymy fall under the phenomenon of ambiguity. An expression is ambiguous if it 
has multiple meanings, where the meanings are either related (in case of polysemy) or 
unrelated (in the case of homonymy). 
A standard test for ambiguity is the Conjunction Reduction test (op. cit.; see also 
Chomsky 1957: 35-6). (3-c) is the conjunction reduction of (3-a) and (3-b):  
 
 
(3) a. Tom is tired.  
b. Jerry is tired.  
c. Tom and Jerry are tired.  
(3-c) makes perfect sense. 
Now consider the polysemous word ‘expire’, which means ‘die’ in (4) and ‘become 
invalid’ in (5):  
(4) Tom expired.  
(5) Tom’s student card expired.  
The conjunction reduction of (4) and (5) sounds odd: 
(6) *Tom and his student card expired. 
(6) is an example of what is known as ‘zeugma’: it is not outright nonsensical, but it sounds 
odd because it is difficult to come up with a straightforward interpretation. There is no 
single property of being expired which can be attributed to both Tom and his student card.  
 To test whether an expression is ambiguous, we can conjoin phrases within the 
scope of the expression to see if the resulting sentence is zeugmatic. If zeugma results, then 
the expression is ambiguous – it is either polysemous or homonymous.  
 Let’s now apply the Conjunction Reduction test to the primary pain terms ‘sore’, 
‘ache’, and ‘hurt’. First consider the following sentences where the subject is a conjunction 
of either body parts or persons but not both:  
(7) a. John’s arms and my legs are sore.  
b. Tom and Lisa are aching.  
 
 
c. Harry’s toes and my fingers are hurting.  
(7)-sentences sound fine. However, the following sound infelicitous:  
(8) a. *John’s arms and I are sore.  
b. *Tom’s hands and Lisa are aching.  
c. *Harry and my fingers are hurting.3  
In (8)-sentences, the subject is a conjunction of a noun phrase (NP) indicating body parts 
with another NP indicating a person. (8)-sentences are zeugmatic because there is no single 
property of being sore or aching or hurting that applies to both NPs in the relevant subject 
position. The two NPs require the respective predicate to express different properties.  
 Another test for ambiguity is the Ellipsis test, which works in a similar manner to 
the Conjunction Reduction test (Lakoff 1970; Sennet 2016). Consider the following elliptical 
construction:  
(9) Larry is tired and so is Jerry.  
(9) has a cross-interpretation – the elliptical phrase ‘so’ is understood to mean ‘tired’ which 
is the elided phrase. Now consider (10), which contains the polysemous word ‘expire’:  
 
3 The linguistic intuitions here have been empirically confirmed. 107 native English speakers on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were asked whether (7)-sentences and (8)-sentences sounded 
odd on a 7-point Likert scale where ‘1’ means ‘This sentence definitely does not sound odd’ and 
‘7’ means ‘This sentence definitely sounds odd’. ANOVA yielded no significant difference among 
the three sentences in each group [(7)-sentences: F(2, 249)=0.47, p=0.62; (8)-sentences: F(2, 249)=0.10, 
p=0.90]. Average ratings for (7)-sentences and (8)-sentences were 2.75 (SD=2.07) and 6.03 (SD=1.54) 
respectively. A paired-sample t-test of the two groups showed significant differences between 
average ratings of (7)-sentences and (8)-sentences [t(83)=19.84, p<0.001].  
 
 
(10) Tom expired and so did his card.  
(10) is odd or zeugmatic. With a cross-interpretation, ‘so did his card’ would have to mean 
‘his card expired (died)’. A card can be said to ‘expire’, but not in the sense that Tom can 
be said to ‘expire’. The predicate ‘expire’ applies to persons, e.g. Tom, and inanimate 
objects, e.g. cards, in different senses.  
To test for ambiguity, we can construct an ellipsis to see whether a cross-
interpretation results in zeugma. 
 Now consider primary pain terms again. The following elliptic constructions allow 
cross-interpretations and sound fine:   
(11) a.  John’s arms are sore and so are my legs.  
b. Tom is aching and so is Lisa. 
c. Harry’s toes are hurting and so are my fingers.  
In contrast, the following are zeugmatic:  
(12) a. *John’s arms are sore and so are we.  
b. *Tom’s hand is aching and so is Lisa.  
c. *Harry is hurting and so is my thumb.4  
 
4  These linguistic intuitions have been empirically confirmed. Results from 76 native English 
speakers showed average ratings for (11)- and (12)-sentences of 2.15 (SD=1.63) and 4.88 (SD=1.89) 
respectively. A paired-sample t-test showed significant differences between the two groups 
[t(67)=13.64, p<0.001]. Average ratings for each of the (11)- and (12)-sentences were: 1.82 (SD=1.33), 
2.47 (SD=1.90), 2.16 (SD=1.66), 5.24 (SD=1.83), 5.16 (SD=1.82), 4.25 (SD=1.89). Pairwise comparisons 
 
 
(12)-sentences do not allow cross-interpretations without sounding somewhat odd.  
The failure of both the Conjunction Reduction test and the Ellipsis test 
demonstrates that primary pain terms such as ‘sore’, ‘ache’ and ‘hurt’ are ambiguous – 
applying to a person and a person’s body part in different senses. If they are ambiguous, 
then they are either polysemous (where the meanings are related) or homonymous (where 
the meanings are unrelated). The hypothesis that they are homonyms is quickly ruled out. 
Clearly, the relevant meanings are related – if S’s body part is described as 
sore/aching/hurting, then S can also be described as sore/aching/hurting. So, these pain 
terms must be polysemous.  
A case for polysemy can also be made for the primary pain term ‘pain’ itself. A 
common way to report pains in English is to use the phrase ‘in pain’:  
(13) I am in pain.  
(13) is used to report physical pain, e.g. when someone is injured, as well as emotional pain, 
e.g. when someone is grieving. In these cases, pain is treated as a mental state of a person 
or a sentient being. The phrase ‘in pain’ does not apply to body parts:  
(14) *My leg is in pain. 
(14) is odd because body parts are not the kind of entities that are capable of having mental 
states. Nevertheless, we also speak of pains of body parts, modifying the noun ‘pain’ with 
a prepositional phrase indicating a body part:  
 
showed that (12c) was rated as less odd than (12a) [t(67)=4.28, p<0.001] and (12b) [t(67)=3.44, 
p<0.001].  
 
 
(15) There is a pain in my arm.5  
Although we cannot perform a typical ambiguity test for the word ‘pain’ here, it is 
plausible that ‘pain’ is a word with two separate but related meanings, marked by distinct 
syntactic properties. When the word follows the preposition ‘in’, it indicates a state of a 
person. When it is modified by a prepositional phrase like ‘in the arm’, it indicates a state 
of a body part. Indeed, given the polysemy displayed by the other three primary pain terms, 
this would seem to be the best way to explain the above two uses of the word ‘pain’. Hence, 
all of the four primary pain terms seem to be polysemous.  
 
3. Resolving the Paradox of Pain  
The polysemy of primary pain terms allows us to give a response to the alleged paradox 
of pain.  
 Concepts are constituents of thoughts, just as the meanings of words are 
constituents of the meanings of sentences. Ambiguous words, which fail the relevant 
linguistic tests (as we saw in the previous section), make different contributions to the 
meanings of the sentences which they feature in and thus express distinct concepts. The 
polysemous word ‘expire’ expresses at least two distinct concepts – the concept of dying 
and the concept of becoming invalid. Similarly, the polysemy of pain terms, which can apply 
 
5 Arguably (15) is logically equivalent to ‘My arm hurts’, and in the case of (15), the word ‘pain’ 
should be understood as referring to a state of the body part, not a thing in the body part (Hyman 
2003; Liu 2020).   
 
 
to both persons and body parts, reflects two separate but related folk concepts of pain. One 
concept tracks the so-called ‘mental conception of pain’, which reflects pain as a mental 
state of a person or a sentient being. The other concept of pain tracks the ‘bodily conception 
of pain’, which treats pain as a state of a body part.6  
Once we see that there are two concepts of pain, rather than one, the air of paradox 
dissolves. To motivate the paradox of pain, we would have to assume that there is a single 
concept of pain. But as we saw, we should not think that there is only a single folk concept 
of pain. So, there is no paradox. The intuition that there is one results from a failure to 
distinguish the two concepts of pain.   
 However, my proposal faces an objection. If there are two folk concepts of pain 
rather than one, why has this fact escaped theorists’ notice? After all, it is fairly obvious 
that there are at least two concepts of expiring and no one has confused the two. In 
response, two points can be made.  
First, there is a significant overlapping of the contexts where the two concepts of 
pain can be appropriately tokened, which might make it hard to keep the two concepts 
apart. Consider again the paradigmatically polysemous word ‘expire’, which latches onto 
two separate but related concepts – EXPIRE1 (die) and EXPIRE2 (become invalid). The tokening 
of EXPIRE1 in the context, say, of John dying, does not license the tokening of EXPIRE2. The 
fact that John expired1 has nothing to do with whether any of his possessions, e.g. student 
 
6 It is possible that one concept of pain derives from the other, just as one meaning of a polysemous 
word can derive from another (e.g. ‘expire’ – the meaning ‘become invalid’ derived from the 
meaning ‘die’). But the direction of this derivation requires further investigation.   
 
 
card, have expired2. Conversely, the tokening of EXPIRE2 does not license the tokening of 
EXPIRE1. The fact that John’s card expired2 by no means implies that John has expired1. Since 
the contexts in which the two concepts get tokened are generally distinct, this makes it easy 
to track the two distinct concepts of expiring.  
In contrast, pain concepts seem to be different. On the current proposal, there are 
two concepts of pain – PAIN-m (the mental concept) and PAIN-b (the bodily concept). The 
tokening of PAIN-b generally licenses the tokening of PAIN-m. The fact that Sally has a pain-b 
in her leg typically means that she is undergoing an experience of pain-m, that is, she is in 
pain-m. Since pain experiences are often associated with specific body parts, the tokening 
of PAIN-m often licenses the tokening of PAIN-b. The fact that Sally is in pain-m often means 
that a part of her body has pain-b.7 Such an overlap makes it hard to keep apart the two 
concepts of pain. So it is no surprise that theorists have overlooked the solution for the 
paradox of pain put forward here.  
Second, polysemy can come in degrees, and the multiple concepts polysemous 
words express might be regarded as distinct to different extents (Deane 1988; Tuggy 1993). 
Consider the verb ‘paint’, which could mean ‘cover a surface with paint’ or ‘depict or 
produce a picture’. Arguably, the two concepts expressed by the verb ‘paint’ are not so 
distinct – both involve the idea of applying coloured substance onto a surface (see Tuggy 
1993). Consider also the type of polysemy known as ‘pros hen’ (i.e. focal meaning) 
(Aristotle Metaphysics Γ2), where the related meanings of a polysemous word stem from a 
core meaning (Sennet 2016). For instance, the word ‘healthy’ has a core meaning which 
 
7 Phantom pain would constitute a case where one has pain-m but not pain-b. 
 
 
applies to things that are capable of having health, as in ‘John is a healthy person’. We also 
have expressions like ‘healthy blood’ (something a healthy person produces) and ‘healthy 
food’ (something that is conducive to health), where these related meanings of the word 
derive from the core meaning. One might easily mistake cases of pros hen for expressing 
unified concepts when they should be taken to express related but distinct concepts. So, 
insofar as the concepts expressed by polysemes are disparate to different extents, the two 
concepts expressed by the word ‘expire’ might be regarded as more disparate than those 
reflected by primary pain terms. Again, therefore, it is not surprising that the polysemy of 
the latter has been overlooked. 
 
4. Conclusion  
As we have seen, primary pain terms, i.e. ‘pain’, ‘sore’, ‘ache’, and ‘hurt’, are arguably 
polysemous, applying to both a person and a person’s body part. The result of this 
linguistic analysis has direct implications for the alleged paradox of pain. Pace some 
theorists (e.g. Hill 2005, 2017), there is no reason to think that there is a genuine paradox of 
pain. This is not because the folk only have a bodily conception of pain (pace Reuter et al. 
2014, 2020), nor because there is a single folk concept of pain which is ‘polyeidic’ (pace Borg 
 
 
et al. 2020).8 It is because there are at least two concepts of pain – mental and bodily. Once 
we recognise this fact, the puzzle dissolves.  
 Relatedly, there has been an important debate in the philosophy of pain between 
those who think pains are bodily conditions (e.g. Hyman 2003; Massin 2017; Reuter et al. 
2019) and those who think that pains are feelings (e.g. Kripke 1980; Lewis 1980; Tye 2017). 
But given the discussion in this paper, the dichotomy seems to be ill-posed. I have argued 
that there are two separate but related concepts of pain manifested in our ordinary talk. So, 
in asking what the nature of pain is, we ought first to distinguish between two notions of 
pain.9  
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